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INTRODUCTION

Two young fish are swimming along together. They suddenly come upon
an older fish, who in passing says to them, “Morning, boys. How’s the water?”1
The young fish swim hurriedly past, each looking confused. Leaving the older
fish behind, one turns to the other and asks, “What the hell is water?”2
So begins David Foster Wallace’s commencement address to the 2005
graduating class of Kenyon College, the point of which was “merely that the
most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and
talk about.”3 The irony of the parable and its poignant truth reaches a more
global resonance when considered in light of the United States’ most obvious,
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1. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THIS IS WATER: SOME THOUGHTS, DELIVERED ON A SIGNIFICANT
OCCASION, ABOUT LIVING A COMPASSIONATE LIFE 3 (2009).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 8.
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though least discussed crisis in history: the depletion of our freshwater resources.4 Alarmingly, in the next fifty years the United States will face not just
drought, but complete dissemination of readily accessible water resources in
areas ranging from its breadbaskets5 to its commercial and financial epicenters.6
As these lakes, reservoirs, wells, and aquifers drain, the communities that depend upon them will seek alternative and further-reaching water sources into
which they can dip their proverbial straws. The most alluring and perhaps the
most vital of these sources are the Great Lakes.
In recognition that such straws may descend and that “Future Diversions
and Consumptive Uses of Basin Water resources have the potential to significantly impact the environment, economy and welfare of the Great Lakes–St.
Lawrence River region,” the region surrounding the Great Lakes championed
for effective protections of Great Lakes waters.7 The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (the “Great Lakes Compact” or
the “Compact”), signed into effect in 2008 by President George W. Bush after
being adopted in all eight states that border the lakes, as well as the two Canadian provinces to the north, is a legally-binding, international water compact
that attempts to manage withdrawals out of the Lakes by creating a blanket
prohibition on diversions outside of the Great Lakes Basin.8 However, this
stringent provision makes way for three important exceptions: the intrabasin
transfer exception, the straddling community exception, and the straddling
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4. See Dennis Dimick, If You Think the Water Crisis Can’t Get Worse, Wait Until the Aquifers
Are
Drained,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
Aug.
21,
2014,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140819-groundwater-california-drought-aquifers-hidden-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/CJ5Q-DUAE].
5. A 2013 Kansas State University study determined that if Kansas farmers continued irrigating
crops and watering livestock from the Ogallala aquifer at the current rate, in fifty years the aquifer
would fall sixty-nine percent below its current level. See David R. Steward et al., Tapping unsustainable groundwater stores for agricultural production in the High Plains Aquifer of Kansas, projections
to 2110, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. E3477, E3477 (Aug. 26,
2013); see also Roxana Hegeman, High Plains Aquifer will be 69 percent depleted in 50 years, K-State
study says, WICHITA EAGLE, Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.kansas.com/news/article1121517.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/XA74-3YVE]. This figure is staggering, as the aquifer lies underneath
more than eight Great Plains and its waters supports a fifth of all irrigated crops produced in the country. See SANDRA POSTEL, WATER: RETHINKING MANAGEMENT IN AN AGE OF SCARCITY 20 (1984).
6. See Daniel Griffin & Kevin J. Anchukaitis, How Unusual Is the 2012–2014 California
Drought?, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 8673, 9017 (2014); Matt Stevens, California drought most
severe in 1,200 years, study says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-california-drought-worst-20141205-story.html [https://perma.cc/CCY8-SVFS].
7. Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110–342, §
1.3, 122 Stat. 3739, 3742–43 (2008) [hereinafter Federal Compact]; see also WIS. STAT.
§§ 281.343(1m) (2013–2014).
8. S.J. Res. 45, 110th Cong. (2008) (“[e]xpressing the consent and approval of Congress to an
interstate compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin”); see also
Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8.
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county exception, all of which allow diversions to communities on the fringes
of the basin.9
While the Great Lakes Compact seeks to protect waters threatened by diversions, in reality far-flung communities like those in Las Vegas or Arizona
do not immediately threaten the Great Lakes because the cost of a pipeline
would be so expensive.10 Rather, the most immediate threats to the Compact’s
purpose are communities just outside of the basin. Enter the City of Waukesha,
Wisconsin: a town faced with its own unique water crisis and armed with a
short, but historically and legally significant straw.11 Less than twenty miles
outside of Wisconsin’s largest city, Waukesha lies in a county that straddles the
basin divide,12 and thus was in a geologically fortunate position to apply for a
diversion.13 Waukesha had struggled for years with overdraft issues, eventually
leading to a contamination of the groundwater supply the water utility provided
to its own citizens and those in neighboring communities with radium, a radionuclide that can cause cancer.14 After years struggling to petition the Great
Lakes Council to approve a diversion of Great Lakes water to the thirsty communities, Waukesha alone was finally afforded one pursuant to the Compact’s
diversion processes on June 21, 2016.15
The approval was limited to the City of Waukesha and those “town islands”
located just outside its municipal boarders only, leaving the neighboring communities the water utility served without access to the diversion waters.16 This
narrowing of the service areas to the municipal boundaries of the City of
Waukesha was contrary to Wisconsin’s adaptation of the compact, which differs significantly in its definition of “community.” Where the Federal Compact
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9. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9.
10. In fact, the cost of ocean water desalination would likely be cheaper. Mark Brush, Here are
2 reasons why the drought in California won’t open the door to Great Lakes water, MICH. RADIO, Apr.
23, 2016, http://michiganradio.org/post/here-are-2-reasons-why-drought-california-wont-open-doorgreat-lakes-water#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/SA9K-AB7Q](“[F]or states like Arizona, California,
and even Texas it would be cheaper for them to build desalinization plants—these plants convert
ocean water into drinking water.”).
11. See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS 240–49 (2006).
12. WIS. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, VERSION 1.2, CITY OF WAUKESHA PROPOSED GREAT LAKES
DIVERSION: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 14, i (2015) [hereinafter DIVERSION EIS];
see infra Figure 1.
13. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3).
14. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Toxic Substance Portal–Radium,
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=790&tid=154 [https://perma.cc/83Y9-A7AM] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (“Exposure to high levels [of radium] results in an increased risk of bone, liver, and
breast cancer.”) [hereinafter ATSDR CDC Radium Notice].
15. Final Decision, In the Matter of the App. By City of Waukesha, Wis. For Div. of Great Lakes
Water, No. 2016-1 § III(1), Attachment 1 (Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Council June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Approval Decision].
16. Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5).
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17. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
18. See WIS. STAT. § 281.346(4)(e)(em) (2013–2014).
19. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.3(2)(d).
20. See generally, Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II.
21. Somers Spring Election Results April 7, 2015; Published on Village and Town of Somers
(http://www.somers.org [https://perma.cc/Z6C9-FNMM]).
22. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015).
23. See id.
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defines it narrowly as a “city, town, or equivalent thereof,” 17 Wisconsin defines
it much more broadly, and this broader definition allows for Waukesha’s entire
service area, even that outside of its municipal boundaries, to be granted access
to Lake Michigan water.18 These inconsistencies seem to run afoul of the universal stated purpose of the Compact: to “facilitate consistent approaches to
Water management across the Basin.”19
These inconsistencies serve to highlight a reoccurring theme in Wisconsin:
disregard for Compact requirements. Regardless of the definition of community—indeed, regardless of the approval of the diversion itself—state action has
already been taken in subversion of the Compact, seriously jeopardizing its status as the ultimate protector of Great Lakes water.20 The subversion began in
2015 when the Town of Somers divided itself in half to incorporate the Town
and Village of Somers.21 Reincorporation effectively made the Village, located
entirely within the basin divide, Compact compliant. The Town, however,
straddled the basin and was supplied with water purchased from the City of
Kenosha, a similarly situated town on the basin divide just to the south. As
both municipalities fell under the “straddling communities” exception to diversions out of the basin, and both would require the expensive and time-consuming undertaking of Compact compliance in order to divert water from Kenosha
to the Town of Somers.
However, these processes were effectively avoided in the summer of 2015
when the Wisconsin legislature enacted Item 66, which almost entirely restricted the Kenosha County Water Utility’s ability to deny water service to
communities and municipalities along its borders.22 Essentially, Item 66 did
what Waukesha’s diversion application sought—to extend Great Lakes water
outside the municipality’s borders—though without the headache of following
Compact procedures.23
This Comment dives into the history and complexity of the Great Lakes
Compact and develops the theory that the Compact’s past and present challenge
its validity and its protective power. Part II will examine the history of the
various Great Lakes protection plans that led up to the Great Lakes Compact,
paying particular attention to how the history of these protection plans may
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shadow the Great Lakes Compact’s own potency.24 Part III will dissect the
Compact itself and the key differences between the definition of “community”
in Wisconsin’s adaption of the Compact and in the Federal Compact language.25
Part IV will develop the road Waukesha traveled on its path to a diversion request and the analysis the Council adopted in ultimately approving it.26 Finally,
Part V will examine Item 66 and will apply the Council’s analysis from its decision approving Waukesha’s diversion to determine whether the Town and
Village of Somers are in fact entitled to the diversions they receive, ultimately
demonstrating that the 2015 legislative act seriously undermines the potency
and staying power of the Great Lakes Compact.27
Thus, the historic weakness of federal water protection measures, the approval of the Waukesha diversion, and ultimately the Wisconsin legislature’s
circumvention around the Compact all show that while the Great Lakes Compact is a progressive step, it remains a weak protection for the country’s most
obvious, though least appreciated resource.
II. THE INITIAL GREAT LAKES PROTECTION PLANS
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24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
28. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906) (the Court dismissed without prejudice and
awarded costs to Illinois after Missouri alleged that the Sanitary District of Chicago would reverse the
flow of the Chicago River and in effect pollute the Mississippi).
29. See Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada, U.S.–Gr. Brit. (for Canada), Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Treaty with Great Britain]; Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 11, 1985, http://www.cglslgp.org/media/1366/greatlakescharter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5EG-CEKR] [hereinafter Great Lakes Charter]; DAVID NAFTZGER, The Great
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact: protecting freshwater and promoting sustainability, in WHOSE DROP IS IT, ANYWAY?–LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING OUR NATION’S WATER
RESOURCES 161, 175–88 (Megan Baroni ed., 2011).

38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 173 Side A

The abundance of Great Lakes waters coupled with the precariousness of
the Lakes’ hydrological condition presented a pressing protection problem for
the United States early in its history. Efforts for large scale diversions began
as early as 1840 with the building of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, and
by mid-nineteenth century Chicago saw conflict when it reversed the flow of
the Chicago River in order to divert polluted wastewater out of the city, and in
effect diverted nearly 65 million gallons a day out of Lake Michigan and into
the Mississippi watershed.28 Efforts to protect the Lakes began to formulate
shortly thereafter, making the Great Lakes Compact only the latest in a long
history of measures to protect the Lakes from diversions.29
The first measure to protect the Lakes came about in 1909, when the United
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States and Canada signed into effect the Boundary Waters Treaty (the
“Treaty”).30 The Treaty purported to govern all basins shared by the United
States and Canada and sought to protect the equal rights of both countries for
use of the waters.31 It limited existing uses to those “uses, obstructions, and
diversions heretofore permitted or hereafter provided for by special agreement”32 and provided that
no further uses or other uses or obstructions or diversions,
whether temporary or permanent, of boundary waters on either
side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow of boundary
waters on the other side of the line, shall be made except by
authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada
within their respective jurisdictions and with the approval, as
hereinafter provided of a joint commission, to be known as the
International Joint Commission.33
This clause gave both the United States and Canada and the International
Joint Commission34 great control over to whom use of the waters would be
granted. However, managing the resource was a unique and complicated endeavor and these complexities infected the Treaty with fundamental weaknesses.35
For example, the standard articulated above in Article III alleging to protect
against diversions “affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on
the other side of the [border]line”36 in fact “offers little practical value.”37 A
single diversion would not have quantifiable effects on the Lake’s “level or

02/22/2017 09:25:38
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30. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29.
31. BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 968 (5th ed. 2013); Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. VIII (“The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own side, equal and similar rights to use of the waters hereinbefore defined as boundary waters.”). It was not until the years following World War II that the Treaty
evolved into an environmental protection agreement when “citizens and scientists became increasingly
alarmed about water pollution in the Great Lakes.” Noah D. Hall, Boundary Waters Treaty Centennial
Symposium: Introduction-The Centennial of the Boundary Waters Treaty: A Century of United StatesCanadian Transboundary Water Management, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1431 (2008).
32. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. III.
33. Id.
34. The International Joint Commission, officially “[e]stablished in 1911 to administer and discharge the purposes of . . . Treaty,” works particularly “to assist Canadian and U.S. governments in
finding solutions to problems related to waters which lie along or flow across the U.S–Canada border.”
David de Launay, Implementing The Great Lakes Charter Annex Resource Based Decision Making
Standard in Each Jurisdiction, 5 TOLEDO J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 479, 482 n.13 (2003).
35. Id. at 486–87.
36. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. III.
37. Hall, supra note 31, at 1440.
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flow”38 as a result of the sheer volume of Great Lakes water.39 What was
needed was an accounting of all diversions out of the lakes, which likely would
lead to conclusions that collective diversions in fact affect levels or flow, but
no “formal allegations of Boundary Waters Treaty violations” have yet surfaced
to this effect.40 Additionally, “[w]hile individual withdrawals and diversions
from tributary rivers and streams often do have a measurable effect on these
waters, these [types of] waters are not protected under the Boundary Waters
Treaty.”41
Nevertheless, the Treaty generally helped “limit conflict between the nations over their shared water resources.”42 To more comprehensively control
diversions out of the Great Lakes, in the 1940s and ’50s, the Basin states began
to organize efforts to specifically control diversions.43 In 1968, Congress authorized the creation of an interstate compact that created the Great Lakes Commission (the “Commission”).44 The Commission sought to control Basin management through research, development, and the subsequent implementation of
protection plans.45 To this end, the Basin’s eight governors and two premiers
effectuated the Great Lakes Charter of 1985 (the “Charter”).46 The Charter was
the first international, voluntary agreement that delineated the management procedure of a shared water resource between the United States and another international power.47
Signed by the governors and the premiers of the Canadian provinces adjacent to the Great Lakes, the Charter purported “to manage diversions out of the
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38. Treaty with Great Britain, supra note 29, Art. III.
39. Hall, supra note 31, at 1440–41.
40. Id. at 1441.
41. Id. Additional conflicts arise out of inconsistencies among states’ common law approaches
to water law. As the Treaty covered all waterways between the United States and Canada, its scope
reached some states or territories following the law of prior appropriation as well as others that follow
the law of riparianism to manage the shared resources. As the Treaty did not resolutely delineate how
these particular conflicts could be resolved, nor did it indicate what system of water management was
preferable, the resolution of conflicts between states that follow the different doctrines is rich, but
inconsistent. See id.; see generally GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE
RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2000). To complicate
matters more, the resolution of the conflicts between international parties is equally fraught with conflicting opinions and outcomes. Id.
42. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 970.
43. Id. at 972.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
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lakes as well as consumptive uses of the lakes.”48 Specifically in regard to diversions, the Charter required that a state or province provide “prior notice and
consultation” to the others about any “major” diversions and required the State
to simultaneously seek the other’s “consent and concurrence” before orchestrating or otherwise authorizing a diversion.49 Consent was necessary from all
signing parties for diversion of five million gallons a day or more.50
Preceding and prompting the enactment of the Charter, Sporhase v. Nebraska51 introduced the notion that water is in fact an article of commerce according to the Dormant Commerce Clause, and that movement of such an article across state lines may not be arbitrarily upheld or otherwise discriminated
against.52 In Sporhase, a provision of a Nebraska state law prohibited the exportation of Nebraska groundwater to any other state without a permit.53 The
Supreme Court ruled the provision to be arbitrarily discriminatory and further
held that because Nebraska failed to show a compelling state interest in the
provision, the provision was invalid on its face.54 While the decision brought
to light the commercial status and marketability of water, it also brought to the
surface doubts about a state’s ability to autonomously limit water diversions to
locations outside of that state.55
In response to Sporhase, the Charter became an agreement between the
governors and premiers to vest export control of Great Lakes water in themselves.56 However, the Charter’s effectiveness proved unreliable.57 Firstly, as
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48. Amanda K. Beggs, Note, “Death by A Thousand Straws”: Why and How the Great Lakes
Council Should Define “Reasonable Water Supply Alternative” Within the Great Lakes Compact, 100
IOWA L. REV. 361, 367 (2014).
49. Great Lakes Charter, supra note 29; see also Beggs, supra note 48, at 367–68.
50. Beggs, supra note 48, at 367–68.
51. 485 U.S. 941 (1982).
52. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53. Sporhase, 485 U.S. at 957 (“the reciprocity provision operates as an explicit barrier to commerce between the two States”).
54. Id. at 955. While the Court held that the state’s interest in water conservation was highly
appropriate and legitimate within an objective sphere, the “burden imposed imposed [by the Nebraska
statute] on . . . commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. at 954. The
first part of the Nebraska statute upheld the interest and the contested provision was found invalid. Id.
at 955–56.
55. Dana M. Saeger, Comment, The Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Compact: Groundwater, Fifth Amendment Takes, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 12 GREAT PLAINS
NAT’L RES. J. 114, 130 (2007) (“While groundwater was indeed ruled an article of commerce by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska, that designation came with a condition of its own-namely
the right of Congress to so regulate groundwater in the future as an article of commerce.”).
56. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973; see also Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
57. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 175–76; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973.
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it was an entirely voluntary agreement, it was non-binding.58 Congress was not
asked to ratify that Charter as an interstate compact, thus affording it great
weight, because of the inclusion of the two Canadian provinces.59 Additionally,
“the voluntary Charter’s lack of meaningful standards by which diversions were
to be regulated has proven impossible to enforce, leaving the Basin states and
provinces with a toothless management tool.”60 Thus, contrary to the intent of
the Commission, the non-binding nature left the Charter as more of a “gentlemen’s agreement” than a comprehensive management plan.61
Also devastating to the Charter’s effectiveness, a year after the Charter went
into effect Congress enacted the 1986 Water Resources Development Act
(WRDA).62 While the WRDA similarly provided that diversions of Great
Lakes water without the approval of all eight Great Lakes governors and the
two Canadian premiers were impermissible, it also allowed a state to “unilaterally veto any diversions occurring within an entirely separate state, creating the
serious potential for abuse of power and conflicts among the Great Lakes governors.”63 This unilateral veto power made it impossible for states to act with
any confidence when it came to diversion issues and altogether discouraged
investment and ultimate action.64
The WRDA also contained serious foundational problems. Although its
enactment by Congress meant it was legally binding and actionable, it did not
“set any standards or processes for challenging diversions out of the Great
Lakes.”65 Furthermore, “the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause
likely rendered the WRDA unconstitutional.”66 Thus, the Charter ultimately
carried the day for water resources management. However, the Charter’s weaknesses rendered its legacy as merely a “Paper Tiger Regarding Water Withdrawals.”67
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58. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972.
59. See Beggs, supra note 48, at 367; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972.
60. Gabe Johnson-Karp, Comment, That the Waters Shall Be Forever Free: Navigating Wisconsin’s Obligations Under the Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Compact, 94 MARQ. L. REV.
415, 428 (2011).
61. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 972.
62. Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d–20; see also
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973 n.85.
63. Beggs, supra note 48, at 368. See WRDA, supra note 62, at § 1962d–20(d). See also
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 973 (The WRDA “in effect took the dormant commerce clause
and Sporhase . . . out of play in the basin.”).
64. Beggs, supra note 48, at 368.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Jodi Habush Sinykin & Donna L. McGee, Opportunities and Challenges for State Implementation of Water Conservation Under the Great Lakes Compact: Report and Toolkit, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1193, 1200 (2006); see also WIS. STAT. §§ 281.35(4)(1)–(2) (2013–2014).
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In response to the continuing lag in freshwater resource management, the
Great Lakes governors and premiers appointed representatives to the Water
Management Working Group to develop what would become the Charter Annex.68 Over a period of almost six years, the Working Group consulted with
the public, water resources experts, and representatives of key stakeholder
groups to develop a new agreement that would bind the region to a consolidated
management system while also providing a common standard through which
diversions and other projects may be reviewed.69 The Annex ultimately led to
the enactment of the Great Lakes Compact.70
The Great Lakes Compact was thus in a sense a reactionary response to the
failure of both the Charter and the WRDA.71 Reactionary because the failures
of the latter two along with the ever-pressing need for the economic and environmental preservation of the precious resource all called for a more immediate,
valid, and lasting means of regional Great Lakes Water management.72 And
indeed the Compact has been lauded as accomplishing these things because of
its procedural transparency and the commitment of the governors and premiers
to holding themselves accountable for its success.73 Additionally, by electing
the form of an interstate compact, the drafters of the Compact assured a more
secure means of diversion management, as compacts are unrivalled in potency
by any existing or proposed institutional arrangement.74 Sanctioned by the
Constitution,75 interstate compacts “have provided a means by which states
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68. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 177–80; see generally Council of Great Lakes Governors,
The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter, June 18,
2001, http://www.cglslgp.org/media/1369/greatlakescharterannex.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XMKESVC] [hereinafter Charter Annex].
69. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 175–84; Charter Annex, supra note 68, at 2–3.
70. Beggs, supra note 48, at 369.
71. See Habush Sinykin & McGee, supra note 67, at 1200. “For decades Canadians and Americans in the Great Lakes Basin have feared that the thirsty will come calling.” ANNIN, supra note 11
at, 11. However, some organizations have declared that such large-scale diversions are unlikely, like
the International Joint Commission instituted by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Id. at 11. Nevertheless, scholars like Professor Noah D. Hall and Dr. Peter H. Gleick validate the fears of Canada and
the United States in citing the incredible upswing in recent water conflicts as evidence that diversion
requests will only increase. Id. at 12–13. The “somber lesson” of the Aral Sea in the former Soviet
Union provides credence to the opposition’s view to bar diversions out of the Lakes. ROBERT
GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2009). The
Aral Sea was once the fourth-largest inland body of fresh water. Id. The Soviets allowed so many
diversions out of the lake that it lost 90% of its volume and 75% of surface area in a matter of mere
decades. Id. While the immediate call for Great Lakes water may seem small, many such diversions
could decimate the region’s water resources, as experienced in the Soviet Union. Id. at 97–98.
72. See GLENNON, supra note 71, at 96; NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 178–84.
73. NAFTZGER, supra note 29, at 182–84.
74. SHERK, supra note 41, at 29–30.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State.”). However, not all compacts must be ratified by
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could enter into agreements for various purposes, including the delineation of
shared boundaries, involvement in common-interest projects such as the building of dams and bridges, and the creation of regional or sub-regional administrative endeavors such as resource management.”76
Apart from its more significant legal potency, the Compact is “distinguishable from its predecessor, the [WRDA], by its establishment of the Regional
Council to oversee exemption applications and specific standards by which exemption applications are . . . evaluated.”77 The addition of a specific and accountable decision-making body makes the process for diversion more difficult
and the potential for granting many applications may thus be more limited.78
All this benefits the credibility of the Compact.79
However, although the Great Lakes Compact is a much greater protective
measure against diversion than ever before, the historical weaknesses of the
past measures to protect the waters of the Great Lakes bode ill for the reliability
of this most current effort.80 These persistent weaknesses were recognized by
New York Congressman Brian Higgins, a member of the Congressional Great
Lakes Task Force, after the approval of Waukesha’s diversion.81 He instated
House Bill 5538, which was passed on July 14, 2016, about a month after the
diversion plan was approved, and grants $300 million to the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Fund.82 Poignantly and seemingly in recognition of the

02/22/2017 09:25:38

C M
Y K

38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 176 Side A

Congress. Only those interstate agreements “tending to the increase of political power in the States,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States” are subject to
Congressional approval. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). The mere fact that the
Great Lakes Compact required approval by Congress points to the political capital held by those states
controlling an enormous natural resource.
76. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 429–30; see also, e.g., Virginia, 148 U.S. at 504; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557 (1851); Boulder Canyon Project
Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 617, 617(c), (g), (l) (2006)).
77. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 431.
78. See id. at 432.
79. See id.
80. See Habush Sinykin & McGee, supra note 67, at 1199.
81. Press Release from Rep. Brian Higgins (N.Y.), Higgins Wins Approval for Amendment Protecting Great Lakes from Future Attempts to Divert Water, (July 14, 2016), https://higgins.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/higgins-wins-approval-for-amendment-protecting-greatlakes-from-future [https://perma.cc/2WGG-SPQX]. Higgins urged that “[g]oing forward, it will be
important to ensure that the approval of this request does not set a precedent that will threaten to deplete
this resource by encouraging further diversion requests that do not uphold the strict water management
standards outlined in the compact.” Id. Implicit in his remarks were displeasure with the approval and
lack of confidence in the Council.
82. H.B. 5538, 14th Cong. 2d Sess. Title 1, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5538/text [https://perma.cc/VE84-JQYH]. The funds could be used by “the head of
any Federal department or agency, with the concurrence of such head, to carry out activities that would
support the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement programs,
projects, or activities; to enter into an interagency agreement with the head of such Federal department
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Council’s highly contested diversion approval, the bill restricts access to the
Fund by those states who seek to use it “in contravention of the interstate compact regarding water resources in the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River Basin.”83
While the bill in theory “tightens up the policy to help restrict further diversions,”84 merely restricting access to federal funding does not in whole protect
Great Lakes waters.85 A more comprehensive plan including revisions to state
and federal policy regarding water diversions must be instituted and programs
shoring up awareness, respect, and conservation of water resources must be undertaken with more seriousness. The Lakes are still vulnerable to “death by a
thousand straws.”86 Although their waters are plentiful, they are largely nonrenewable, as “less than 1% of their waters are replenished by annual precipitation” and the other 99% was deposited by the glaciers thousands of years
ago.87 This means that if more than one percent of water is withdrawn, only the
assistance of another ice age could realistically replace that which is not returned.88
Regardless of their precarious hydrological position, the Lakes remain a
“particularly inviting target for diversion proposals.”89 As the they contain an
unparalleled amount of freshwater—ninety-five percent of the total freshwater
in the United States and twenty percent of the world’s freshwater—diversion
requests likely will continue into the foreseeable future.90 With Waukesha’s
diversion approved, the inevitability of future diversions loom large based on
the weaknesses of the Compact and its predecessors.91
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or agency to carry out these activities; and to make grants to governmental entities, nonprofit organizations, institutions, and individuals for planning, research, monitoring, outreach, and implementation
in furtherance of the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.”
83. Id. § 500.
84. Higgins, supra note 81.
85. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 12, 71.
86. Id. at 71.
87. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 971 (citing Jerome Hinkle, Troubled Waters: Policy and
Action in the Great Lakes, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 281, 288 (2003) (“it takes 300 years for water for
water from Lake Superior to reach the Atlantic”)); see ANNIN, supra note 11, at 13.
88. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 13.
89. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 970.
90. Id.
91. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 12 (“I don’t think the era of water diversions is over by any
means,’ argues Noah Hall, a professor at Wayne State University Law School in Michigan who spent
years with the National Wildlife Federation. ‘To me it’s not even a question, it’s an inevitability. You
look at what’s happening to water supplies in almost every other part of the country—it used to be just
the Southwest and California, but now you are seeing it in the Southeast, and the Northeast—the economics are fluid. It’s a simple supply-and-demand model.”).
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III. THE FEDERAL COMPACT ADOPTED IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin, along with all territories that border the Lakes—the eight states,
Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 92 and two Canadian provinces, Ontario and Quebec, adopted the
Compact by 2008.93 Congress ratified and President Bush signed the Compact
into law shortly thereafter.94 The Compact was then incorporated and codified
by the Wisconsin Legislature into section 281.343 of the Wisconsin Statutes.95
The incorporation is, for the most part, a faithful adaption of the Compact and
moreover speaks to the process-driven implementation the Compact drafters
sought to evoke in water managers at all levels.96
The diversion application process in the Wisconsin adaptation largely replicates that of the Federal Compact.97 Applications regarding proposed exceptions to the Compact that must undergo regional review98 are evaluated by the
Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council (the “Council”),99 which is composed of the governors of all parties.100 Generally, the
Council is charged to “adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for
water resources conservation and management in the basin.”101 Further, a regional body, which in addition to the governors includes the two premiers for
Ontario and Quebec, is further “charged with oversight authority in the regional
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92. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014); 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 147 (2016); IND. CODE
§ 14-25-15-1 (2016); MINN. STAT. § 103G.801 (2015); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 21-1001 (LexisNexis 2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1522.01 (LexisNexis 2013); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 817.21
(2016). See also Naftzger, supra note 29, at 185.
93. After Congress ratified the Compact, there was difficulty adopting it in Wisconsin. See Dan
Egan, Great Lakes Compact Hits Rough Waters, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2008, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/29486169.html. Particularly, challenges developed regarding the
requirement that diversion approvals necessitated the unanimous consent of all eight governors. Id.
To the estimation of some Wisconsin lawmakers, this unreasonably burdened Wisconsin by giving too
much weight to the prohibition on diversions. Id.
94. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
95. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2013–2014); Dan Egan, Great Lakes Deal Announced, MILWAUKEE J SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2008; Susan Saulny, Ban Near on Diverting Great Lakes
Water, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/us/23lakes.html
[https://perma.cc/97XR-YJEW].
96. See Egan, supra note 95.
97. See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343; Federal Compact supra note 7.
98. Proposed diversions to communities within straddling counties must undergo regional review. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(f); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3)(f).
99. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4L)(a) (“Proposals for exceptions subject to council review shall
be submitted by the originating party to the council for council review, and where applicable, to the
regional body for concurrent review.”); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.7(1).
100. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(2)(b) (“The council shall consist of the governors of the parties,
ex officio.”); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 2.2.
101. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(3)(a)(3); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 3.1.
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review process”102 that “stops short of final decision making.”103
The similarities continue in the exceptions to the stringent prohibition on
“all new or increased diversions” out of the Great Lakes.104 To temper the prohibition and meet reasonable diversion requests outside the basin, the Compact
included three exceptions to this otherwise rigid embargo.105
The first exception is for “straddling communities.”106 The straddling communities exception provides that communities outside the basin will be permitted diversions, “regardless of the volume of water transferred,”107 so long as
“all of the water so transferred shall be used solely for public water supply purposes within the straddling community”108 and “[a]ll water withdrawn from the
basin shall be returned, either naturally or after use, to the source watershed less
an allowance for consumptive use.”109 A straddling community is defined as
“any incorporated city, town, or the equivalent thereof, wholly within any
county that lies partly or completely within the basin, whose corporate boundary existing as of the effective date of this compact is partly within the basin or
partly within 2 Great Lakes watersheds.”110
The second exception is for “intrabasin transfers.”111 An intrabasin transfer
is “the transfer of water from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into the
watershed of another Great Lake.”112 A proposal for such a transfer will only
be considered if “the proposal results from a new or increased withdrawal of
less than 100,000 gallons per day average over any 90-day period, [wherein]
the proposal shall be subject to management and regulation at the discretion of
the originating party.”113 Under such management, the exception also requires
that (1) “[t]he proposal shall meet the exception standard and be subject to management and regulation by the originating party, except that the water may be
returned to another Great Lake watershed rather than the source watershed;”114
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102. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 431–32; see also WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4h)(e)(9); Federal
Compact, supra note 7, §§ 1.2, 4.5(5)(i).
103. Hall, supra note 31, at 1444.
104. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, at art. 47, §
4.8.
105. See generally WIS. STAT § 281.343(4n) (the diversion exceptions as adopted in Wisconsin);
see also Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9.
106. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1).
107. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1).
108. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1).
109. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(1); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1)(a).
110. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(t); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
111. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2).
112. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(jm); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
113. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(1); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, 4.9(2)(a).
114. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(a); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(i).
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WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(b); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(ii).
WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(b)(2)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(2)(b)(iii).
WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3).
WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d) (emphasis added); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(c); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3).
WIS. STAT.§ 281.343(4n)(c)(a)–(g); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(3)(a)–(g).
David Strifling, Waukesha Diversion Approved; Focus Shifts to Potential Legal Challenges,
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(2) “[t]he applicant shall demonstrate that there is no feasible, cost-effective,
and environmentally sound water supply alternative within the Great Lake watershed to which the water will be transferred, including conservation of existing water supplies;”115 and (3) “[t]he originating party shall provide notice to
the other parties prior to making any decision with respect to the proposal.”116
The third exception is for “communit[ies] within straddling counties.”117 A
community within a straddling county is “any incorporated city, town, or the
equivalent thereof, that is located outside the basin but wholly within a county
that lies partly within the basin and that is not a straddling community.”118 Diversion requests to communities within straddling counties “shall be excepted
from the prohibition against diversions, provided that it satisfies all of the following conditions:”119
a. The water shall be used solely for the public water supply
purposes of the community within a straddling county that is
with- out adequate supplies of potable water;
b. The proposal meets the exception standard, maximizing the
portion of water returned to the source watershed as basin water and minimizing the surface water or groundwater from outside the basin;
c. The proposal shall be subject to management and regulation
by the originating party, regardless of its size;
d. There is no reasonable water supply alternative within the
basin in which the community is located, including conservation of existing water supplies;
e. Caution shall be used in determining whether or not the proposal meets the conditions for this exception. This exception
should not be authorized unless it can be shown that it will not
endanger the integrity of the basin ecosystem;
f. The proposal undergoes regional review; and
g. The proposal is approved by the council. Council approval
shall be given unless one or more council members vote to disapprove.120
As mentioned previously, Waukesha meets the community within a straddling county exception, and is the first community completely outside of the
basin to apply for a diversion.121
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Figure 1: Location and Hydrology of the Basin Divide in Waukesha122

Before any such diversion application can be approved, the Council would
need to consider whether the community requesting the diversion met the exception standard.123 The exception standard requires a community requesting
the diversion to fulfill stringent technical requirements.124 For example, a community would need to prove, among a few other standards, that no reasonable
water supply alternative exists; promise that quantities withdrawn would be
used only for the purposes proposed; and return all water withdrawn from the
Great Lakes back to the Great Lakes, less an allowance for consumptive use.125
In turn, the Council would also have to seriously consider whether the diversion
exception would

02/22/2017 09:25:38

C M
Y K

38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 178 Side B

MARQ. U. L. BLOG, June 23, 2016, http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2016/06/23/waukesha-diversion-approved-focus-shifts-to-potential-legal-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/X93E-6XAF]; see also supra Figure 1 (showing the location of the City of Waukesha and the basin divide).
122. CH2M HILL, INC., REPORT WATER SUPPLY SERVICE AREA PLAN FOR THE CITY OF
WAUKESHA, (Submitted to City of Waukesha, Wis., Apr. 2010) http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/WaterUse/documents/Waukesha/Appendix_D.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7LF-P2PJ].
123. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d).
124. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n).
125. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d)(1)–(3) (where waters returned are not from the Great Lakes,
they must (a) “[be] part of a water supply or wastewater treatment system that combines water from
inside and outside of the basin;” and (b) “[be] treated to meet applicable water quality discharge standards and to prevent the introduction of invasive species into the basin”). Waukesha laid out its compliance with these standards in its application in five volumes (Application Summary, City of
Waukesha Water Supply Service Area Plan, City of Waukesha Water Conservation Plan, City of
Waukesha Return Flow Plan, City of Waukesha Environmental Report for Water Supply Alternatives).
DIVERSION EIS, supra note 12, at i.
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126. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(d)(4).
127. Request for Hearing Letter from Jill M. Hutchinson, J.D., Jenner & Block, LLP, on behalf
of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, to Executive Director of the Great Lakes–St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council (Aug. 19, 2016) (on file with author).
128. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e); see generally Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
129. WIS. STAT. § 281.346 (2013–2014).
130. WIS. STAT. § 281.346, 281.346(4)(e)(1)(em).
131. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(b); infra Figure 2.
132. WIS. STAT. § 281.346(4)(e) (2013–2014).
133. See Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
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be implemented so as to ensure that it will result in no significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity
or quality of the waters and water dependent natural resources
of the basin with consideration given to the potential cumulative impacts of any precedent-setting consequences associated
with the proposal. 126
The precedential impacts of the Waukesha diversion have yet to be felt in
their entirety; however, the recent request by the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Cities Initiative (the “GLSL Cities Initiative”) for a hearing before the Council
will likely provide greater insight onto the exception standard’s requirement for
consideration of precedent-setting consequences.127
Hidden among these procedural and definitional similarities is an impactful
inconsistency with the Federal Compact, which will remain a thorn in the side
of regional water conservation management for years to come unless
amended.128 The Wisconsin adaptation of the Compact includes in its definition
of community within a straddling county the notion that any diversion to the
community will extend to its entire service area.129 Section 281.346, entitled
“after the compact takes effect,” requires that communities within straddling
counties submit a diversion proposal that “is consistent with an approved water
supply service area plan under s. 281.348 that covers the public water supply
system.”130
Herein lies the crux of issue with Waukesha. Waukesha’s diversion application is inflated to reflect of not just the City of Waukesha’s needs, but also
the needs of other communities outside the municipal boundaries to which the
Waukesha Water Utility extends water service.131 Under section 4(e), such a
request is required and a subsequent diversion is valid.132 However, applying
the language of the Federal Compact, a diversion would only extend to the
boundaries of the City of Waukesha and no further.133 This glaring inconsistency was one hurdle Waukesha faced before the Council and the Council’s
final decision approved Waukesha’s service area to the municipality itself and
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town islands, thus extending water service beyond the City’s boundaries.134
However, as Section V will illustrate, communities like Waukesha—landlocked, thirsty, and determined to divert—may do so regardless of a diversion
application denial at either the state or federal level.135
Figure 2: Approved Diversion Area136
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134. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5).
135. Infra Part V.
136. Approval Decision, supra note 15, Attachment 1.
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While the Compact’s adoption in Wisconsin presents significant issues for
the future, the Compact’s progressive nature deserves praise. Although hydrological principles showed, and the legislatures of various states had recognized
to some degree, that groundwater and surface water are hydrologically connected in many, if not most instances, the law itself was slow to adjust.137 In
fact, the law in many regions beyond just the Great Lakes continues to treat
them as separate legal entities.138 However, the Compact took a progressive
measure by defining water as “groundwater or surface water contained within
the basin.”139 The Compact as so adopted by the Wisconsin Legislature went
on to recognize that waters of the basin, or basin water, refers to “the Great
Lakes and all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels, and other bodies of
water, including tributary groundwater, within the basin.”140 This progressive
declaration was one of many that hopefully will herald in a new area and approach to water law and policy.141
IV. WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION APPLICATION
Waukesha’s road to a diversion was neither short, nor easy to travel. Section IV.A will review the history of Waukesha’s water use and the hurdles it
jumped to ultimately receive a diversion.142 Section IV.B will dissect the Approval Decision as it concerns the diversion area ultimately adopted by the
Council and will analyze how the vagueness in the Council’s decision leaves
the Compact vulnerable.143
A. History Leading Up to the Approval
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137. R. Timothy Weston, Partner, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, Evolving
Issues in Eastern Water Law, Harmonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use, A.B.A.
15TH ANN. SEC. ENV’T, ENERGY & RES. FALL MEETING (Pittsburgh, Pa. Sept. 26, 2007).
138. Id. at I (“In large part, the common law doctrines governing surface and groundwater use
evolved separately, with little to no recognition of the nexus between surface and groundwater within
the hydrologic cycle.”).
139. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(v) (2013–2014).
140. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(x).
141. Id.
142. See supra section IV.A.
143. See supra section IV.B.
144. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 240.
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The City of Waukesha rests on what once was one of the most sought after
freshwater resources in the American Midwest.144 So famous was the “Spring
City” aquifer that during the 1892 World’s Fair a riot almost erupted when a
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Chicago businessman, frustrated by failed negotiations to divert the famous waters south to the fair, sent a midnight train full of workers to steal Waukesha’s
water.145 Today, while the aboveground city has retained its historic character,146 below ground, its historically pristine drinking water is a thing of the past.
The City of Waukesha is currently home to more than 71,000 residents,147
as well as large-scale commercial and industrial water consumers.148 These
numbers are projected to grow149 and as they have grown in the past, the attendant effect has been an overdraft of Spring City’s wells, resulting in plummeting water levels and contamination of the underground aquifer.150 While
the supply of the water has dropped significantly in the past twenty years,
alarming from both an economic and ecological perspective, of more immediate concern is the contamination issue.151 Waukesha first informed its citizens
that their drinking water was contaminated with radionuclides in 1987.152 The
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a notice of violation to the
City, advising it that the water supply was contaminated with radium at twice
the federal level that same year.153 Radium, a carcinogen once celebrated for
its luminosity and cosmetic enhancing effects,154 currently resides on the United
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145. Id. at 241. The townspeople reacted to the oncoming heist with equal fervor, arming themselves and meeting the train as a mob. Id. The thieves never disembarked and returned to Chicago
that night empty-handed and unwilling to return. Id.
146. Beyond the infamous water war, the city itself is home to numerous historic sites and has
even achieved Landmark & Historic District Designation according to section 28.01 of the Waukesha
Municipal Code, making its wholesome surface appearance markedly different from that which lies
beneath. WAUKESHA, WIS., CODE § 28.01 (2013–2014).
147. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241; see also United States Census Bureau, State & County Quick
Facts; Waukesha (city) Wisconsin, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/5584250,00
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
148. Technical Memorandum from Richard Hope, P.E., AECOM, to Waukesha Water Utility 2
(Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with author) (the industrial consumers use about 13% of the annual water
supply with projections for growth by 2050, necessitating the larger diversion of 10 million plus gallons
of water per day); Don Behm, Waukesha defends water use projections in Lake Michigan diversion
bid, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 20, 2014, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/waukeshadefends-water-use-projections-in-lake-michigan-diversion-bid-b99210127z1-246428621.html
[https://perma.cc/D8QP-A5HA].
149. Id. at 2.
150. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241.
151. See id. at 241–42.
152. Noah Hall, Waukesha Great Lakes water diversion proposal strongly opposed, GREAT
LAKES LAW BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/great_lakes_compact/
[https://perma.cc/3VUS-RFVD]. [hereinafter Hall Blog]; see also John Luczaj & Kevin Masarik,
Groundwater Quantity and Quality Issues in a Water-Rich Region: Examples from Wisconsin, USA, 4
MDPI RES. 324, 338 (2015).
153. Hall Blog, supra note 152; see ANNIN, supra note 11, at 241–42; see generally ATSDR
CDC Radium Notice, supra note 14.
154. Taylor Orci, How we Realized Putting Radium into Everything Was Not the Answer, THE
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/03/how-we-realized-putting-radium-in-
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States Environmental Protection Agency’s list of three groups of restricted radionuclides that appear in groundwater.155 The radium contamination issue,
while for years increasing in seriousness, finally reached levels of such concern
that in 2003 the State of Wisconsin required Waukesha to sign a consent order
agreeing to take “certain interim and permanent steps to achieve compliance
with state radionuclide requirements” by December 8, 2006.156 The EPA placed
an order on the City to alleviate the problem by 2018.157
The problem of radium contamination is not unique to Waukesha. As Figure 3 depicts, eighteen counties in the state of Wisconsin face some level of
radium contamination.158 Many of these counties straddle the Great Lakes basin divide.159 The watershed extends furthest inland in the northernmost part of
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everything-was-not-the-answer/273780/ [https://perma.cc/W3N8-A76M] (Mar. 7, 2013); see ATSDR
CDC Radium Notice, supra note 14.
155. Radionuclides Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/radionuclides-rule#compliance [https://perma.cc/5CY2-9LSN] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). The
EPA set the standard for radium in drinking water at 226/228 picoCuries per liter (pCi/L) to ensure
water customers obtain water that meets the maximum contaminant levels for the toxin. Id. As reiterated above, Waukesha currently must treat water containing more than twice the federal levels. ANNIN,
supra note 11, at 241. Although radionuclides appear “naturally in most rocks and soils,” they can
easily “dissolve in water, which means they can be drawn into . . . well water.” RadTown U.S.A., U.S.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www3.epa.gov/radtown/subpage.html#?
ENVTL.
scene=The+Burbs&polaroid=House&sheet=1 [https://perma.cc/72RM-34U5] (last visited Feb. 7,
2017). The deeper a well is dug, more likely is the chance that “the soil and rocks surrounding a well
have high enough concentrations . . . contain[ing] levels that exceed EPA’s standards.” Id.
156. Judgment, Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr.
8, 2009); see Annin, supra note 11, at 242; see also Stipulation and Order for Judgment, Wisconsin v.
City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr. 8, 2009).
157. Dan Shaw, Waukesha’s water application sent to Great Lake states, provinces for review,
THE DAILY REPORTER (Milwaukee, WI), Jan. 7, 2016.
158. See infra Figure 3.
159. Of the eighteen counties indicated as having radium problems in Figure 3, seven straddle
the divide. Of these seven counties, three (Racine, Waukesha, and Dodge Counties) are home to seven
communities whose groundwater is contaminated with radium above the federal level. Compare infra
Figure 3, with Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Great Lakes Drainage Basins in Wisconsin, WDNR: GREAT
LAKES,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/greatlakes/documents/DrainageBasinsMap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PXC-U9T7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) [hereinafter WDNR Great Lakes Drainage
Basin Map], and Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Radium in Drinking Water. PUB-DG-008 2014,
http://dnr.wi.gov/files/pdf/pubs/dg/dg0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5S7-5W6J] (last visited on Feb. 7,
2017). While seven is arguably a low number of communities, the amount of legal, technical, and
industrial infrastructure needed to supply these communities with uncontaminated water would conservatively total than $1.449 billion. See Don Behm, Opponents of Waukesha water diversion plan
focus on service map, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12, 2015, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/opponents-of-waukesha-water-diversion-plan-focus-on-servicemap-b99535418z1-314442901.html [https://perma.cc/N6NH-JEXX] (Waukesha estimated it would
cost about $207 million to build the means of providing Great Lakes water, and the sum of $207 million
multiplied by seven is $1.449 billion).
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the State from the shores of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior.160 As the Basin
extends southward, the divide ebbs and flows out from the shores of Lake Michigan, eventually receding closer and closer to the shoreline.161 In Kenosha
County, at the boarder of Wisconsin and Illinois, the divide reaches its narrowest point in the State.162 There, the divide runs nearly through the direct center
of the city of Kenosha.163 In Waukesha County, the basin divide extends to the
rough line of Sunny Slope Road, west of the City of Milwaukee.164 This position on the basin divide fortunately provided the City of Waukesha the avenue
it needed to resolve its radium problem, as it opened the possibility for a Great
Lakes water diversion.165
Figure 3: Wisconsin Wells Contaminated with Radium Above EPA
Maximum Level166
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160. DIVERSION EIS supra note 12, at 1.
161. Id. at 2, figure 3.3 at 32.
162. WDNR Great Lakes Drainage Basin Map, supra note 159.
163. Id.
164. See supra Figure 1.
165. See infra Section V.
166. Luczaj & Masarik, supra note 152, at 337 (“Region of the state with the majority of wells
that exceed the U.S. EPA maximum containment levels (MCL) for combined Radium of 5 pCi/L (0.185
Bq/L).”).
167. Don Behm, Waukesha concedes it can’t meet deadline for radium-free water, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Nov. 19, 2014, http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/waukesha-concedes-it-canmeet-deadline-for-radium-free-water-b99393845z1-283255831.html
[https://perma.cc/6DYU-
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Waukesha recognized that it would not be able to comply with the Order
and independently alleviate its radium contamination as 2018 approached.167
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However, the Order by the state and the EPA, coupled with the adoption of the
Great Lakes Compact at a federal and state level, opened the way for Waukesha
to request the help it desperately needed.168 Before it could apply for a diversion, Waukesha first was required to exhaust alternative source options before
looking eastward toward the Lakes.169 This was not an impossible feat. For
example, New Berlin, a community that borders the Basin and thus fitting the
straddling community exception, was “the first practical application” of the
Compact to be granted diversion and drew praise from numerous environmental
advocates for its creative attempts to source water from elsewhere outside the
basin.170 It was also required to return all water withdrawn back to Lake Michigan.171
Before conceding to these processes, Waukesha creatively argued that it
was hydrologically unique and deserving of special consideration.172 In addressing the issue of return flow173 Waukesha argued that it was already extracting water that came directly from Lake Michigan as underground recharge.174 This argument was essentially purporting that Waukesha did not
need a return flow plan as it in fact did not need to apply for a diversion.175 In
ways, the argument was sensible. It took up the yoke of a long running dispute
centering on the interconnected nature of ground and surface waters—a dispute
that scientists, hydrologists, and the Compact drafters themselves had championed for years in the face of unchanging legislation and legal agency red tape.176
And in the face of the Compact, which specifically granted Great Lakes “tributary groundwater” classification and protection, the argument was all the more
supported.177 Nevertheless, these arguments failed to take flight and directed
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GXMP].
168. See Stipulation and Order for Judgment, Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, No. 2009-CX-4 ¶
13 (Cir. Ct. Waukesha Cty. Apr. 8, 2009); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9.
169. See WIS. STAT. 281.343(4n)(c)(1)(d) (2013–2014) (providing that diversions are only possible where “[t]here is no reasonable water supply alternative within the basin in which the community
is located, including conservation of existing water supplies”).
170. Darryl Enriquez, New Berlin’s request for lake water approved, a first under Great Lakes
Compact,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL,
May
21,
2009,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/45700837.html [https://perma.cc/T63W-8HF5].
171. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(1) (2013–2014).
172. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 247.
173. Not to be discussed in detail this Comment are the issues of return flow and the conservation
plan required by the compact. Waukesha has considered these requirements and provided detailed
plans for both in its application and environmental impact statement.
174. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 247–49.
175. Id.
176. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1m)(2) (“The waters of the basin are interconnected and part of a
single hydrologic system.”); see Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.3; Weston, supra note 137, at I.
177. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(x).
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Waukesha further down its path to submitting to a diversion proposal.178
As it looked more and more certain that a diversion proposal was the only
means by which Waukesha could supply uncontaminated water, Waukesha was
forced to consider the headache the Compact’s conservation requirements
would impose upon them.179 This headache would be considerable, especially
given Waukesha’s long history of neglecting conservation practices.180 In
2005, the city took a new approach to soften its image as a water waster.181 It
instituted a sprinkler limitation on individual property owners, only permitting
sprinkler use two days week from May through October between the hours of
5 p.m. and 9 a.m.182 It also provided rebates for buyers of certain water-efficient
toilets, created a rate structure that promoted water conservation, and engaged
in community and educational outreach.183 All of these efforts were cited to on
the eventual application as evidence of Waukesha’s commitment to solving its
water crisis.184
Ultimately, the immediately pressing need for uncontaminated water forced
Waukesha to comply with the Compact’s diversion request processes.185 The
first application was submitted in May 2010 to the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources (“WDNR”), and a revised version was resubmitted in
2013.186 In its Conservation Plan, Waukesha designated itself as a “water conservation leader” based on the significant steps it had recently taken to protect
its limited water supply.187 It also at last conceded to a return flow plan through
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178. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 245.
179. Id. at 245–46.
180. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 246. The City of Waukesha’s “underwhelming water conservation
record” was a subject of critical debate in the years and months leading up to submitting its diversion
application. Id. For example, the city “prided itself on never having a sprinkling ban,” offering “customers a sewer credit for water applied to their grass.” Id.
181. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 246.
182. WAUKESHA, WIS., CODE § 13.11(3) (2006).
183. Application Summary, City of Waukesha Application for a Lake Michigan Diversion with
Return Flow, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., ftp://dnrftp01.wi.gov/geodata/water_division/waukesha_diversion/application/1_City_of _Waukesha_Application__Summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), § 3.4
[hereinafter Application Summary].
184. Id.
185. See generally City of Waukesha Diversion Application Timeline, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES.,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/WaterUse/waukesha/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/54KK-R4PF] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017); Sarah E. Sharp, Interpreting Water Conservation Standards in Waukesha, Wisconsin: A
Local Internalization of International Norms?, 16 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 113 (2012).
186. Application Summary, supra note 183, at iii. This diversion request is less than the original
request for 10.9 million gallons a day. Id.
187. City of Waukesha Water Conservation Plan, WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES.,
ftp://dnrftp01.wi.gov/geodata/water_division/waukesha_diversion/application/3_City_of_Waukesha_Conservation_Plan.pdf. (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), § 1. The Conservation
Plan spanned more than 200 pages, detailing the background of the city’s conservation efforts and its
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the Root River.188 After exploring the possibility of spending $77 million on
developing new wells in underground aquifers just to the west of the city,
Waukesha concluded that the $42 million price tag to build a pipeline from and
develop a return flow plan to the Lake was more palatable.189 Finally, in addressing the potential for treatment plans, the City argued that potential treatment plans were too costly and found that all alternative sources lacked longevity for the city’s anticipated growth.190
On December 9, 2015, the diversion application was granted a preliminary
approval by the WDNR.191 In its Drafted Environmental Impact Statement, the
WDNR advised that (1) the city does not have a reasonable water supply alternative other than Lake Michigan; (2) “the diversion will not alter the flows or
levels of the Great Lakes” because of the City’s return flow plan; and (3) the
potential supply alternatives “are likely to have a greater overall adverse environmental impacts primarily due to projected impacts on wetlands and
lakes.”192 All of these issues had been adequately demonstrated by Waukesha
in its diversion application.193 Shortly after the WDNR approval, on January 7,
2016, the diversion application was forwarded on to the Council, which reviewed the application and gave it final approval on June 21, 2016. 194
B. The First Diversion Outside the Basin, Approved
The June 2016 approval was granted by a unanimous vote of the Council.195
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continued commitment to them. Id., § 2.
188. Many water conservationists disparaged the Root River plan, because the river itself already
had its own contamination issues. Returning 8.1 million gallons a day—the amount ultimately approved in the June 2016 Approval Decision—water conservationists argued would only exacerbate an
existing problem. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § 5, 7a, 8e. Waukesha’s mayor, Shawn Riley,
alternatively posited that “the wastewater returned to the Lake will be fully treated to levels that satisfy
all applicable state standards. The increased flow will actually improve water quality in the river.”
David Strifling, Waukesha and Racine Mayors Stake Out Opposing Positions on Water Diversion Application,
MARQ.
U.
L.
BLOG.,
Feb.
4,
2016,
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2016/02/04/waukesha-and-racine-mayors-stake-out-opposing-positions-on-water-diversionapplication/ [https://perma.cc/2WFH-R2KC].
189. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 243.
190. Behm, Waukesha concedes it can’t meet deadline, supra note 167 (“Continued reliance on
radium-tainted deep wells would require additional costly treatment to remove the contaminant as well
as increasing levels of salt released from the rock layers.”).
191. Don Behm, DNR to advance Waukesha water diversion bid to Great Lakes governors,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 8 2015, http://archive.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/dnr-to-advancewaukesha-water-diversion-bid-to-great-lakes-governors-b99630401z1-360964451.html.
192. DIVERSION EIS, supra note 12, at 5, 195–96.
193. See generally Application Summary, supra note 183, § 6.
194. See Approval Decision supra note 15, §§ I (4), III (1); Behm, DNR to advance Waukesha
water diversion bid, supra note 191.
195. Approval Decision, supra note 15, at 14.
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While in sum granting the diversion, the approval came with certain amendments and conditions on the initial request.196 The most obvious changes are
the decrease from Waukesha’s original request for 10.1 million to 8.2 million
gallons per day, and the reduction of the diversion area.197 Though not clearly
articulated, these reductions nevertheless have significant precedential value as
they set the standards for future diversions.198 Particularly relevant to this Comment is the reduction of the service area to only the municipal boundaries and
the “town islands.”199
Waukesha initially based its application on its water supply service area,
thus including all areas to which its water utility provided water services.200
These areas included small pockets, known as “town islands,” to be absorbed
into Waukesha via an intergovernmental agreement, as well as areas in the City
of Pewaukee, the Town of Delafield, the Town of Genesee, and the Town of
Waukesha, all to which the city provided water in limited capacities through its
water utility.201
Provision of water services outside the boundaries to these outside areas
was contemplated in Wisconsin’s adaptation of the Compact and its incorporation into the larger statutory scheme.202 While free to adopt the Federal Compact, the states had leave to make their adaptations narrower according to federal preemption principals.203 Nevertheless, and as discussed above in Section
IV, Wisconsin’s adaptation of the Federal Compact differs significantly in its
definition of “community.”204 Where the Federal Compact defines it narrowly
as a “city, town, or equivalent thereof,” 205 Wisconsin defines it much more
broadly.206 Its statutes implementing the Compact procedures at section
281.346 and section 281.348 include provisions that require the diversion area
to encompass the “water supply service area plan.”207 This broader definition
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196. Id. § III(2).
197. Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ I(1), II(5). See supra Figure 2.
198. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(10).
199. Id. § II(5)(5b)(i–ii).
200. Id. §§ I(1), II(5); see also City of Waukesha Water Supply Service Area Plan § 3, CH2M
HILL, INC., Oct. 2013, prepared for the City of Waukesha and Submitted to the Wis. Dep’t Nat. Res.
http://www.waukeshadiversion.org/media/1646/2_city_of_waukesha_water_supply_service_area_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HSA-G3GT].
201. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ I(1), II(5); see also Application Summary, supra
note 183, § 3.3.
202. See Wis. Stat. § 281.343(4n) (2013–2014).
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2.
204. See discussion supra Section III.
205. Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2.
206. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d)(2013–2014).
207. See WIS. STAT. § § 281.346(4)(e)(1)(em) (2013–2014) (“The proposal is consistent with an
approved water supply service area plan under s. 281.348 that covers the public water supply system.”).
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allowed for most of Waukesha’s service area, even that outside of its municipal
boundaries, to be granted access to Lake Michigan water to be approved for a
diversion by the WDNR.208 These inconsistencies seem to run afoul of the universal stated purpose of the Compact: to “facilitate consistent approaches to
water management across the basin.”209
In sum, the Council based its Approval Decision on Wisconsin’s definition
of community,210 and in so doing either pointedly ignored or essentially ratified
Wisconsin’s violation of federal preemption principals.211 The Council mandated that “ [n]o part of the Diversion of water from the Basin authorized as the
Approved Diversion Amount may be used by the Originating Party or the Applicant for any territory outside of the Approved Diversion Area.”212 The Approved Diversion Area was greatly reduced from that originally requested as it
extended only to “[i]ncorporated land within the boundaries of the City of
Waukesha and land outside the City of Waukesha’s jurisdictional boundaries
that is served with municipal water by the Applicant through the Waukesha
Water Utility as of May 18, 2016.”213 Nevertheless, this area allowed Great
Lakes waters to be diverted outside of those areas the Federal Compact contemplated.214
In approving the diversion to extend outside of the City of Waukesha’s municipal boundaries, the Council refuted the precedent of “[t]he highest courts
of at least two states, . . . [which] have said that a water compact is federal law
for purposes of the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, and thus, it
supersedes inconsistent state laws.”215 Essentially, where differences emerge
between a federal compact and a state’s adaptation of the same, the federal
compact should prevail, even where “a compact is silent on how its terms effect
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208. Id.
209. WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (1m)(b)(4).
210. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ II(5), II(5)(b)(i).
211. See infra Part IV.
212. Approval Decision, supra note 15, § III(2)(b).
213. Id. § II(5)(5b)(b)(i).
214. See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(5b)(b)(ii).
215. SHERK, supra note 41, at 47 (citing Grant, ‘Water Apportionment Compacts Between
States,’ 4 Waters and Water Rights ch. 46-14, at 46-14 to -15 (R. Beck ed., Matthew Bender & Co.
2004) (1991)); Frontier Ditch Co. v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 761 P.2d 1117, 1123 (Colo.
1988); State ex rel. Intake Water Co. v. Bd. of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 645 P.2d 383, 387 (Mont.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
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state law.”216 In its Approval Decision, the Council did not follow this established precedent.217
Additionally, the decision did not substantially articulate any clear standards regarding the definition of “community.”218 Rather, an amorphous standard emerged regarding service areas, whereby the limits of the diversion are
established at the discretion of the Council.219 As a result, ambiguities and
questions remain regarding the distance to which the Council would permit a
diversion outside a requesting party’s boundaries and what standards those outside areas must meet in order to attain diverted waters.220
These ambiguities and questions tee up the Compact for significant legal
challenges.221 Already the Council’s decision has been challenged by the Great
Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, which on August 19, 2016, requested a
hearing to, among other things, oppose “the service area that includes communities that are not part of the City of Waukesha.”222 These challenges may bring
a more articulated standard to light, but until then, the Approval Decision has
wracked the Compact with even more vulnerabilities.223 As discussed below in
Section V, these vulnerabilities will reach beyond Waukesha to Kenosha’s water woes, which likely be exacerbated by the decision.224
V. KENOSHA: A LEGISLATIVE CHECK ON MUNICIPAL DIVERSIONS AND A
DIRECT HIT ON THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT
The Compact’s potency is currently being tested, unacknowledged by the
Compact Council.225 Very recently, the City of Kenosha attempted to limit its
provision of water supply services to the newly incorporated Town of Somers.226 In response, during the summer of 2015, the Wisconsin State Legislature
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216. SHERK, supra note 41 (stating that when the terms conflict or differ in a state’s adaptation
of a compact, “the results [in applying the compact] are likely to be the same”); see Hall Blog, supra
note 152.
217. See SHERK, supra note 41; Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5).
218. Compare Approval Decision, supra note 15, §§ II(1) with II(5)(5b)(i).
219. See id. § II(5); see generally Hall Blog, supra note 152.
220. See generally Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5); Hall Blog, supra note 152.
221. Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, Cities Challenge Decision to Allow Waukesha Water Diversion—Aim to Preserve Great Lakes Regional Compact (Aug. 22, 2016)
(on file with author); see also Infra Section V.
222. Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 221.
223. See generally Federal Compact, supra note 7; Approval Decision, supra note 15, § III.
224. See supra Section V.
225. See Press Release, Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 221.
226. Meeting Minutes from Board of Water Commissioners Meeting, Charter Ordinance No. 37
by the Mayor—Electing Not To Be Governed by the Provisions of Wis. Stat. § 66.0813(5m), and Establishing Limits on the City’s Provision of Water and Sewer Service Outside of Its Municipal Bound-
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buried in the state budget bill Item 66,227 which limited Kenosha’s denial of
said services to neighboring municipalities,228 and thus the newly minted Town
of Somers secured a diversion of Great Lakes water to the site of a large-scale
industrial development.229 The incorporation of the Town of Somers combined
with the legal implications of Item 66 circumnavigated the procedures enacted
by the Great Lakes Compact to restrict such diversions.230 This circumnavigation has not been widely discussed and seems an underappreciated piece of legislative fiat and municipal deception.231
Section V.A will briefly explore the history of Kenosha’s water supply and
the Town of Somers’ position on the basin divide.232 Section V.B will discuss
the implications of the incorporation.233 Section V.C will analyze Item 66, the
recent legislation strong-arming Kenosha’s water supply to Somers.234 Section
V.D will discuss the serious, though covert, implications that Item 66 has for
vitality of the Great Lakes Compact.235 Last, Section V.E will weigh the counterarguments and limitations to these implications.236 In conclusion, this Section will demonstrate the lack of administrative oversight that should regulate
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aries,
http://kenosha.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=kenosha_6ea35b4510be567352d4a5441ca2f07a.pdf&view=1 [https://perma.cc/X3KL-G5R9] (Nov. 2,
2015).
227. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015). See Jon Brines, Kreuser defends development deal involving chief of staff, KENOSHA NEWS, July 15, 2015, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/kreuser_defends_development_deal_involving_chief_of_staff_483541504.php
[https://perma.cc/H4LT-PQ77] [hereinafter Brines Kreuser] (“Rep. Samantha Kerkman, R-Salem, said
she drafted the legislation with Kreuser, with Somers in mind.”).
228. WIS STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b).
229. Lawrie Kobza, Legislature Limits Kenosha’s Ability to Deny Extension of Municipal Water
or Sewer Service, MUN. L. NEWSL. (Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison, Wis.), July/August 2015 § 3.
230. Communities within straddling counties are required by the Compact, whether as adopted
by Wisconsin or by the Federal Compact, to submit an application for any new diversion. See Federal
Compact, supra note 7, § 4.3; see WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e). The incorporation of the Village of
Somers and the continued annexation of the Town of Somers, though nominal in nature, nevertheless
seems to indicate that there are at the very least nominally new diversions occurring to Town of Somers. The Compact’s lack of language excluding such new diversions and its otherwise strict requirements for any diversion outside the basin seem to require an application.
231. Lawrie Kobza, a lawyer for the city of Kenosha, issued a client alert through her firm,
Boardman & Clark LLP, Municipal Law Newsletter, shortly after Item 66 was passed. Kobza, supra
note 229. Therein she warned her clients that “[i]f the terms of a negotiated agreement can be overridden so easily, it calls into question the binding nature of all intergovernmental agreements.” Id. Ms.
Kobza’s keen observation drew this author’s attention to the weakness the Compact faces in light of
the Wisconsin State Legislature’s blatant rejection of an important, national intergovernmental agreement.
232. Infra Section V.A.
233. Infra Section V.B.
234. Infra Section V.C.
235. Infra Section V.D.
236. Infra Section V.E.

38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 185 Side B

02/22/2017 09:25:38

WABISZEWSKI-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

656

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

2/16/17 12:34 PM

[100:627

diversions of any scale both within and without of the basin.237
A. The Recent Incorporation of the Town and Village of Somers
Kenosha County is wedged snugly between the Wisconsin–Illinois border
to the south, and Lake Michigan to the east.238 In the northern part of the
county, extending at its farthest point at a little less than five miles out from the
shores of Lake Michigan, lies the recently incorporated Town (to the west) and
Village of Somers (to the east along Lake Michigan).239
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237. See infra Conclusion.
238. See infra Figure 4; see generally Incorporation Process, Proposed New Somers Boundary
Map dated Feb. 23, 2015, THE TOWN AND VILLAGE OF SOMERS, http://somers.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Uploads/PROPOSED%20VILLAGE%20MAP%202-23-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D29W-8TE4] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
239. See infra Figure 5. Figure 5 shows the proposed, and subsequently adopted, boundary-lines
for the Town and Village of Somers. Id. The map also shows the areas left to be absorbed by Kenosha
per the original 2005 intergovernmental agreement. Id.
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Figure 4: Watersheds in Kenosha County240
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240. KENOSHA, WIS., ORDINANCE NO. 28-10, Comprehensive Plan for the City of Kenosha:
2035,
Map
3-12,
(Adopted
Apr.
19,
2010)
https://www.kenosha.org/images/dev_insp/COMP_plan/COMP-PLAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM5R-PJRJ].
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Figure 5: Town and Village of Somers Proposed and Subsequently Adopted
Boundaries241
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241. Incorporation Process, Proposed New Somers Boundary Map dated Feb. 23, 2015, supra
note 238.
242. Terry Flores, Somers Town, Village to Become One, Boards Approve Intergovernmental
Agreement, Annexation, KENOSHA NOW, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/somers_town_village_to_become_one _484913884.php.
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Until April of 2015, the Town and Village were a conjoined and unified
municipality known as the Town of Somers.242 In place between the former
whole Town of Somers and the City of Kenosha was the “City of Kenosha and
Town of Somers Cooperative Plan Under Section 66.0307 Wisconsin Statutes”
(Cooperative Plan), an intergovernmental agreement that required certain areas
of Somers (“Growth Areas”) to be annexed and thus absorbed into the City of
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Kenosha by 2035.243 The agreement contemplated the Town incorporating as
a Town or Village and provided that in the event this should occur, the new
municipal entities would be bound by the terms of the Cooperative Plan.244 Additionally, the Cooperative Plan incorporated by reference past agreements between the whole Town and the City in which the two entities agreed that the
City would extend services to Town Growth Areas.245
Before the contemplated annexation could occur, wealthy developers set
their sights to build an industrial complex on a family farm, becoming one of
the few large-scale industrial developments in the Town.246 The site, at the
intersection of Highways H and S, was a little less than a mile from the basin
divide and wholly within the watershed.247 Suddenly, events were put into motion that would chip away at the integrity of the agreement.248 Shortly after the
proposal occurred, Somers applied for an incorporation application to cut the
town in two and in effect force the City of Kenosha to serve water to the new
Town and Village of Somers at low costs for the municipalities.249
Today, the remnant Town is split by the basin divide, as the “[f]ar western
portions of Somers, lie[s] west of the sub-continental divide . . . and
drain[s] . . . ultimately to the Mississippi River.”250 In contrast, the Village is
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243. See City of Kenosha and Town of Somers Cooperative Plan Under Section 66.0307 Wisconsin Statutes, § 18 & Annex C, http://somers.org/sites/default/files/CITY%20OF%20KENOSHTOWN%20OF%20SOMERS%20COOPERATIVE%20PLAN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T57X-XPB8]
[hereinafter Cooperative Plan]; see also Jon Brines, DOT request complicates Somers-Kenosha borders, State Wants Properties Adjacent to Certain Highway Annexed into City, KENOSHA NOW, May 3,
2015,
http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/dot_request_.
complicates_somerskenosha_borders_482502068.php; supra Figure 5 (yellow areas represent Town of Somers and blue areas represent
former Town of Somers areas that will be annexed by the City of Kenosha).
244. Cooperative Plan, supra note 243.
245. Id. § 18.
246. See Kobza, supra note 229; see also Brines Kreuser supra note 227.
247. See supra Figure 5 (the basin divide is at 100th Avenue, and the site is just east of this at
the intersection of 88th and 38th Streets).
248. These events were precipitated by the pressing urges of the wealthy developers who sought
water services to a new industrial development proposed in the middle part of the town. See Kobza,
supra note 229, § 3; Terry Flores, Council OKs 38th Street rezoning, Residents object, say they’re
being shut out by developer, KENOSHA NOW, Jan. 20, 2016, http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/council _oks_38th_street_rezoning_486234077.php. It seems that Kenosha saw this development as a
threat to the intergovernmental agreement in place between itself and the Town and denied the extension to the development. In an effort to avoid Kenosha’s limitation, the Town incorporated the new
Village and succeeding in seeking legislation via Item 66 to allow the development to continue.
249. VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, Apr. 24, 2015, http://www.somers.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Uploads/VillageCertofIncorp.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS34-AKUP]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
250. Profile of Village and Town: Surface Waters and Drainage Basins, THE VILLAGE AND
TOWN OF SOMERS, http://www.somers.org/?q=print/118 [https://perma.cc/SF4W-5K2Q] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017). The new Village of Somers acts under a “a dual governance with the remnant town of
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directly adjacent to Lake Michigan and as it “lies entirely east of the sub-continental divide that separates the Great Lakes basin from the Mississippi River
basin . . . [all of its important waterways] drain . . . ultimately into Lake Michigan.”251 The geological positions of the Town and Village are unique in that
they each could individually be afforded diversions: the Town is within a
“straddling county,” per either the Wisconsin or Federal Compact,252 and the
Village lies entirely within the watershed.253 However, these boundaries only
became effective on April 24, 2015, and before their enactment, Somers was a
municipality to which any new diversions would have been subject to Compact
diversion procedures.254
Though nominally different, the two municipal entities remain largely onein-the-same.255 For example, at the time of reincorporation, the Town and Village were set to “develop [another] intergovernmental agreement that provides
specifics regarding future service sharing (fire & rescue, public works including
sewer and water utilities, garbage and recycling, employees, etc.), regulatory
control, and municipal boundaries, among other issues that will arise between
the Town and Village.”256 Of these shared services, the shared sewer and water
utilities ultimately came from the City of Kenosha.257 While the “Town of
Somers Water Utility purchases water on a wholesale basis from the City of
Kenosha,” “the Village located along the Lake Michigan shoreline [is] served
directly [by] the Kenosha Water Utility.”258 Notably, some Town of Somers
residents receive water from individual wells, implying that the Kenosha water
utility service is not the only practicable means of supplying water.259 Outside
of individual wells, the two municipal entities receive 31 million gallons of
Lake Michigan water per year from Kenosha.260 This sum may require Compact compliance; however, the incorporation of the Village effectively rendered
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Somers representing about 2,627 people and most of the physical acreage some 16-square miles.” Jon
Brines, Election comes down to 1 vote: Small turnout as Somers Village Board, president elected,
KENOSHA
NOW,
July
9,
2015,
http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/election_comes_down_to_1_vote_483032328.php.
251. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
252. See supra Part II; see also WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(d) and (t) (2013–2014); Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 1.2
253. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
254. VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, supra note 249.
255. Incorporation: Impact on Services: Shared Service Agreements, THE VILLAGE AND TOWN
OF SOMERS, http://www.somers.org/?q=print/112 [https://perma.cc/P896-ANHB] (last visited Feb. 7,
2017).
256. Id.
257. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
258. Id.
259. Id. Whether Village residents receive water from individual wells is unclear.
260. Id.; see generally WIS. STAT. § 281.346(3)(a)1 (2013–2014) (“Any person who proposes to
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such compliance inapplicable.261 The Town, on the other hand, may lack certain Compact requirements.262
B. The Implications of the Incorporation
The incorporation of the Town and Village events circumnavigated the
Compact’s procedures and effectively prove the existence of unregulated diversions.263 The reincorporation of the Village of Somers rendered it completely
independent of the landlocked Town of Somers.264 The secondary effect of the
reincorporation was to make the Village Compact-compliant as it now lies entirely within the basin and automatically is exempt from diversion request procedures.265 Such gerrymandering of municipal boundaries is not barred by the
Compact at either a state or federal level.266 The Wisconsin Compact at section
281.346(2)(d) provides that a “county’s boundaries as of December 13, 2005,
shall be used to determine whether a county lies partly within the Great Lakes
basin.”267 No similar provision exists to permanently establish municipal or
“community” boundaries, and indeed it seems unmanageable to restrict towns,
cities, or the equivalent thereof from expanding their boundaries to service citizens as they grow in population.268 This implies that Waukesha too could have
reincorporated either (a) to annex and thus include the municipalities that received its water services or, though admittedly implausibly, (b) to reincorporate
and include portions of land that extended over the basin divide to effectively
make itself more diversion-eligible.269
This secondary effect is not to be understated for two reasons. Firstly, in
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begin a withdrawal from the waters of the state using a water supply system that will have the capacity
to withdraw an average of 100,000 gallons per day or more in any 30-day period, to increase the capacity of a water supply system so that it will have the capacity to withdraw an average of 100,000
gallons per day or more in any 30-day period, or to begin a diversion shall register the withdrawal or
diversion with the department.”).
261. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3; WIS. STAT. § 281.346(3)(a)1.
262. Infra Section V.B.
263. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
264. See supra Figure 5; VILLAGE OF SOMERS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, supra note
249.
265. See supra Figure 5.
266. See generally Federal Compact, supra note 7; WIS. STAT. § 281.343 (2013–2014).
267. Id. § 281.346(2)(d) (2013–2014).
268. See id. § 281.343(1e)(t) (“‘Straddling community’ means any incorporated city, town, or
the equivalent thereof, wholly within any county that lies partly or completely within the basin, whose
corporate boundary existing as of the effective date of this compact is partly within the basin or partly
within 2 Great Lakes watersheds.”).
269. The City of Waukesha is a poor example of a town that could incorporate a portion of land
outside the basin to render itself compact compliant because it is quite far from the basin divide and it
already satisfies another compact exception. See supra Section IV.
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rendering the Village compliant, the Somers municipalities saved their taxpayers significant time, money, and outside resources.270 Where Somers spent
about a year getting Lake Michigan water to the industrial complex development, Waukesha spent over twenty years and millions of dollars on researching,
developing, and eventually lobbying for a Compact Diversion.271 Secondly,
and more pointedly, the incorporation of the Town and Village reveal a means
to circumnavigate the Compact through annexation or reincorporation of other
towns, cities, or the equivalent thereof.272
While the Village was made Compact-compliant, the Town was not rendered so fortunate.273 As it remained a “straddling community,” any new or
increased diversions to it would be subject to a diversion proposal and subsequent approval by the Council according the exception standard, “regardless of
the volume of water transferred.”274 As previously mentioned, the expense of
such a process is incredible; however, both process and expenses imposed by
the Compact were avoided by the enactment of Item 66.275
C. Enacting Item 66
Further damage to the Compact’s potency occurred in June of 2015 “during
a secretive, last-minute stage of the budget process,”276 wherein the Wisconsin
Legislature passed and the Governor Scott Walker signed Item 66.277 Enactment of Item 66 was prompted by the development of the industrial site along
Highways H and S.278 During the development planning stages, Kenosha initially offered to provide the site with water and sewage services in exchange
for the annexation of the area to supplement those areas which were to be annexed in accordance with the Cooperative Plan between the Town and City.279
However, Somers refused and Kenosha in turn denied the extension of water
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270. As Representative Samantha Kerkman of Salem put it, “Somers doesn’t have to run laterals
from other places. It will save taxpayers millions of dollars.” Brines Kreuser, supra note 227.
271. See Supra Section V.A.
272. See generally Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
273. See generally Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
274. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a) (2013–2014).
275. Infra Section V.C.
276. Brines Kreuser, supra note 227.
277. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015).
278. Kobza, supra note 229, § 3 (“An existing water and sewer agreement between Kenosha and
Somers requires Kenosha to provide water and sewer service anywhere in Somers provided service is
taken at certain specified master-meter locations. However, there apparently was interest from a developer or property-owner in the Town of Somers in obtaining service at a different location. Rather
than seeking to negotiate a revision to the existing water and sewer agreement to allow service at this
other location, legislation was sought and obtained to override the agreement.”).
279. See Brines, supra note 198; see also Cooperative Plan, supra note 243, § 19.
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280. See Brines Kreuser, supra note 227.
281. Id.
282. Id. Although the statute did not specifically mention Kenosha County, as Kenosha is the
only “county bordered by Lake Michigan and the state of Illinois,” the implication that the legislature
refers to Kenosha County cannot be refuted. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b).
283. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m); Brines Kreuser, supra note 227 (“‘The city of Kenosha holds a lot of the cards over the years and this levels the playing field,’ [Representative Samantha] Kerkman said. ‘Somers doesn’t have to run laterals from other places. It will save taxpayers
millions of dollars.’”).
284. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m)(b).
285. See generally id.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. KENOSHA, WIS., ORDINANCE NO. 28-10, Comprehensive Plan for the City of Kenosha:
2035, supra note 240, § 3.
288. See ANNIN, supra note 11, at 244.
289. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n) (2013–2014); see generally Kobza supra note 229, § 3.
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utility services to the new development.280 Shortly after this refusal, Item 66
became law.281
Applying exclusively to Kenosha County,282 Item 66 ultimately limits Kenosha County’s ability to deny the extension of municipal water access to
neighboring municipalities.283 The statute provides that these neighboring municipalities
may request the extension of water or sewer service from another municipality in that county that owns and operates a water or sewer utility if the request for service is for an area that,
on the date of the request, does not receive water or sewer service from any public utility or municipality and the municipality requesting the service contains an area that, on the date of
the request, receives water or sewer service from the water or
sewer utility owned and operated by the other municipality.284
The neighboring municipalities’ ability to demand water service is an incredibly powerful one, while Kenosha’s ability to limit service is extremely
confined.285 The only means by which Kenosha may deny service is if “the
utility does not have sufficient capacity to serve the area that is the subject of
the request or if the request would have a significant adverse effect on the utility.”286
Since Kenosha draws its waters from Lake Michigan,287 the supply is virtually unlimited and unencumbered, and thus a denial of an extension to its
neighbors under a claim of incapacity seems virtually unavailable.288 More
likely is a claim that the Kenosha water utility suffers a significant adverse impact in complying with Item 66, because in so doing it violates the Compact.289
The Town, as a straddling community, is required to follow the diversion procedures when any newly proposed diversion to it would result in withdrawals
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290. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
291. Profile of Village and Town, supra note 250.
292. See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
293. See WIS. STAT. § 281.93 (2013–2014); see also WIS. STAT. § 281.95 (2013–2014).
294. Request for Hearing Letter, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, supra note 127.
295. See generally Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, et. all to Members,
Wisconsin Legislature, Remove Budget Provision on Extension of Water and Sewer Service between
Municipalities
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.lwm-info.org/DocumentCenter/View/45
[https://perma.cc/RF9A-ECJC]; Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
296. See generally Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
297. See id.
298. Id.
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in excess of 100,000 gallons a day.290 The Town and the Village already use
31 million gallons of water a year from the Kenosha Water Utility.291 It thus is
reasonable to assume that the increased diversions to the Town for the industrial
development would likely use a supply in excess of the 100,000-gallon-per-day
minimum. Since no compliance with the Compact procedures has been implemented, Somers and the Kenosha water utility are in violation of its requirements.292 Violations of the compact could result in a hearing before the Council
or even litigation.293 The impending litigation to be contemplated in the GLSL
Cities Initiative hearing before the Council is an example of the Compact’s conflict resolution procedures in action and in effect poses a significant adverse
impact for the parties involved in terms of liability and litigation expenses.294
However, this liability and the attendant adverse impact are uncertain.295
The Town and Village could counter by claiming that their payment for services
balances out the adverse impact of diversions—though this is a weak claim;
payment does not dispel litigation. Regardless of these claims, Item 66 nevertheless weighs heavily in favor of granting requests, and although it sets up
measures for Kenosha to deny these requests, these measures are untested and
thus uncertain.296
Before being passed into law, Item 66 was met with strong opposition by
not just the Kenosha County municipal water utility, but also by numerous water protection groups and municipal support groups.297 In a memorandum to
the Wisconsin State Legislature, the Wisconsin Rural Water Association,
League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Municipal Environmental Group-Water,
and Wisconsin Water Association, as representatives of “virtually every community, water, and wastewater utility in the state of Wisconsin” vehemently
urged the legislature to reject Item 66.298 They argued that granting “one municipality [the power] to in essence force another municipality to extend water
and sewer services is ill-conceived, short-sighted public policy that will have
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significant adverse financial, health and other impacts.”299 Imperatively, “provision 66 supersedes any ordinance or agreement relating to shared services
currently in effect, thereby, preempting previously negotiated boundary agreements and water and sewer agreements.”300
Before Item 66 was even signed into effect, the Kenosha Board of Water
Commissioners put to vote whether or not to be governed by the soon to be
enacted legislation.301 In a charter issued before the City Council by the Mayor
of the City of Kenosha on February 16, 2015, the Council unanimously voted
not to be governed by the provisions of Item 66 and thereby established limits
on the city’s delivery of water services to neighboring municipalities.302 This
motion seems to place Item 66 in the position of a paper tiger, much like the
Charter, although the ability of a municipality to refuse to follow state law is
uncertain.
D. The Implications of Item 66
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299. Id.
300. Id. (emphasis omitted).
301. Meeting Minutes from Board of Water Commissioners Meeting, supra note 226.
302. Id. The charter was moved by Commissioner Juliana, seconded by Commissioner Gordon
to approve, and subsequently passed by a 5–0 vote. Id.
303. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m) (West Supp. 2015).
304. See generally WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0813(5m); Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water
Association, supra note 295.
305. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
306. Id.; see Kobza, supra note 229, § 3; Strifling, Waukesha and Racine Mayors Stake Out Opposing Positions, supra note 188.
307. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
308. Id.
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The codification of Item 66 at section 66.0813(5m) gives it the teeth the
Charter lacked and expands its implications beyond the boundaries of Kenosha.303 Where many items that pass through the budget do not have the force
of law, by codifying Item 66, the Wisconsin legislature essentially provided
Somers a cause of action and enforcement power should Kenosha refuse to
abide by it.304 Additionally, it opened the possibility of Item 66 being scrubbed
of its geographical limits and expanding its reach to other communities.305 A
further possibility remains that similar legislation could be passed in other basin
states permitting Great Lakes water to be serviced to communities outside the
basin.306 These possibilities echo the spirit of the Wisconsin Rural Water Association memorandum, which urged that Item 66 could have far-reaching consequences if approved.307
Like the precedential impact of the permitting of the Waukesha diversion,
the precedential value of Item 66’s enactment broaches a variety of issues.308
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First and foremost, if the terms of a negotiated agreement between two governmental bodies can be so easily overridden by legislation, the binding nature and
magnitude of all intergovernmental agreements, here particularly the Great
Lakes Compact, is called into question.309 Second, the Council’s interpretation
of “community” and Approved Diversion Area—meaning the limited areas of
the City of Waukesha and its town islands—does not altogether bar Waukesha’s
entire service area from access to Great Lakes water.310 As Item 66 demonstrates, a town in a straddling community, and thus requiring compact adherence, can nevertheless lobby its legislature and demand access to Great Lakes
water from its suppliers.311 Thus, if such legislation were to be passed regarding
Waukesha, the neighboring municipalities of Pewaukee, Genesee, Delafield,
and the Town of Waukesha, to which Waukesha provides water services, could
access the Great Lakes Water.312 Third, the incorporation acted as a sort of
utility service area redistricting akin to the much-litigated issue of legislative
redistricting and showed that towns outside the basin, like the Town of Somers,
can easily get Great Lakes water.313
Finally, although the Compact makes exceptions from the diversion prohibition for preexisting diversions, it does not afford the same courtesy to newly
created diversions through legislative mandate.314 Thus, new diversions approved by Item 66 would nevertheless require Compact compliance.315 As
these steps have not been contemplated by the Town of Somers, nor even by
the City of Kenosha, it appears again that Item 66 has supplanted the Compact’s
rigorous procedural requirements.
For these reasons, it seems that Item 66 is in serious jeopardy of both violating the Compact and subjecting it to startling vulnerability.316

As explained above, the incorporation of the Town and Village of Somers
and Item 66 circumvent the Compact as they each allow a diversion to a community outside the basin.317 Per the Wisconsin and the Federal Compact, “[a]ll

See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
See Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II(5)(5b)(ii).
See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
See generally Approval Decision, supra note 15, § II.
See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m) (2013–2014).
See WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n).
See generally WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n).
See supra Section V.D.
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318. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4m). See Federal Compact, supra note 7, § 3.8.
319. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(1e)(km).
320. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4h).
321. See supra Section V.A.
322. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a).
323. However, such an option comes at a considerably greater expense to Somers, which would
be responsible for the water management and the return flow. As such, the option is both unattractive
and unlikely.
324. WIS. STAT. § 281.343(4n)(a)(2).
325. See generally Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
326. See Memorandum from Wisconsin Rural Water Association, supra note 295.
327. Id.
328. See supra Sections IV, V.
329. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
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new or increased diversions are prohibited.”318 A “[n]ew or increased diversion” means a new diversion, an increase in an existing diversion, or the alteration of an existing withdrawal so that it becomes a diversion.”319 The measures
undertaken in Somers increased an existing diversion of Great Lakes water and
at least in theory should subject the Town to Compact procedures.320
However, implications from the approval of Waukesha’s diversion could
potentially limit the potency of such observations on Kenosha’s water woes.321
The Town of Somers, although entirely outside of the basin, nevertheless could
in theory successfully apply for a diversion pursuant to the requirements of a
community in a straddling county.322 And if it does so successfully, it could be
afforded access to Lake Michigan water no matter the objections of the City of
Kenosha, thus rendering these observations moot.323 It is also entirely possible
that the Town would not need a diversion permit if its newly proposed water
use would not exceed 100,000 gallons a day.324
Additionally, unlike Waukesha, Kenosha has no foreseeable need to supply
neighboring municipalities—the sole exception being the Town of Somers.325
Perhaps the legislature in some way saw Item 66 as a remedial measure for a
small town that could not otherwise afford to provide its citizens with the infrastructure they deserved.326 In approving Item 66, the legislature granted a small
exception, and thus it may be unlikely that Item 66 would ever apply to other
Wisconsin communities.327
All these limitations on this Comment’s argument could give back to the
Compact the influence it very rightly deserves.328 Yet the limitations are only
potential ones, and the very existence of this Comment shows the reality of the
Compact’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. At the very least, the implications
of a town that straddles the basin divide accessing the waters without Compact
Council approval should give any water conservationist or legal expert—or indeed any resident of the Great Lakes region—pause.329
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VI. CONCLUSION

330. Strifling, Waukesha Diversion Approved, supra note 121.
331. See Kobza, supra note 229, § 3.
332. The Great Lakes region’s economy “is a $2 trillion juggernaut.” ANNIN, supra note 11, at
53.
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333. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
334. Supra Section IV.B.
335. Supra Section V.
336. Johnson-Karp, supra note 60, at 416 n.4 (“Wisconsin’s parallel enactment of Compact, including provisions that nothing in Wisconsin’s enactment of the Compact ‘may be interpreted to
change the application of the public trust doctrine under article IX, section 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution or to create any new public trust rights.’ Wis. Stat. § 281.343(1).”).
337. See, e.g., Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 156 (2012).
338. Supra Section IV.B.
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While “the Waukesha case has been a striking demonstration that the process set up under the Compact works, no matter what one’s position on the
outcome,” the water diversions into Somers equally demonstrates that the Compact is not universally applied where necessary.330 Indeed, in its apparent disregard for intergovernmental agreements, Item 66 seriously calls into question
the binding nature of the Great Lakes Compact.331 Couple Item 66’s success in
diverting Compact procedure with Waukesha’s precedential success in the issuance of a Compact diversion, and the United States could face an unprecedented threat to the environmental sanctity and the economic vitality of the
Great Lakes region.332 While one such diversion is seemingly inconsequential,
the refreshed potential to send water outside the basin is nevertheless disconcerting.333
While Waukesha’s immediate water woes likely will be solved by the 2016
diversion, the Approval Decision’s vagueness leaves uncertain certain standards required for a diversion.334 Equally uncertain is the immediate future for
Kenosha’s ability to limit water service.335 Additionally and in general, issues
remain regarding whether in approving the diversion the Wisconsin DNR violated its duties as trustee under the public trust doctrine, a doctrine which requires that the state preserve for its people the quality and quantity of water
available.336 Similar issues are unresolved about whether granting to a municipality power over a large chunk of water is a similar abdication of the public
trust.337 Finally, the application of federal preemption principals remains untested.338
As this Comment discussed, the historic weakness of federal water protection measures, the approval of the Waukesha diversion, and ultimately the Wisconsin legislature’s circumvention around the Compact all show that while the
Great Lakes Compact is progressive step, it remains a weak protection for the
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county’s most obvious, though least appreciated resource.339 It is notable that
in a 2016 survey conducted by the Marquette University Law School Poll, only
fourteen percent of participants had ever heard of a contamination issue in their
communities, and only forty-one percent expressed any level of concern about
water safety in their communities.340 These statistics seem to show, if not a lack
of concern, at least a lack of understanding about the source from which an
individual’s water is derived. At the conclusion of all these observations, one
can turn again to David Foster Wallace’s fish allegory and “wonder if we’re
like David Foster Wallace’s fish: surrounded by water, yet somehow unable to
appreciate its existence.”341
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339. Supra Sections IV, V.
340. Charles Franklin, Professor of Law and Public Policy and Director of the Marquette Law
School Poll, Marq. Univ. L. Sch., Address at Public Policy and American Drinking Water Conference:
Public Perceptions of Drinking Water Contamination 5:10:52 (Sept. 7, 2016).
341. Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 750 (2014).
* J.D., 2017, Marquette University Law School; B.A., 2013, Marquette University. This article
is for my father, whose decency, humility, faith and character have made me the person I am today. Without him, this article would never have been written. Thank you, dad.

